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Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts and
the Problem of Recusal
Paul B. Lewis*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent Texaco-Pennzoil litigation, Texaco alleged that the
presiding judge's failure to recuse himself violated due process. It
is uncontested that Joseph D. Jamail, the principal attorney for
Pennzoil, contributed $10,000 to the re-election campaign of Judge
Farris, the presiding judge in the case.' Neither Mr. Jamail nor
Judge Farris disclosed to Texaco the $10,000.contribution.' Texaco
argued that because due process requires the opportunity to be
heard in a meaningful manner,3 including review by an "impartial
and disinterested tribunal," ' 4 Judge Farris's failure to recuse himself
violated due process of law. The Texas Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding that no due process violation occurred because "Judge
Farris neither participated with Pennzoil in the case being tried
nor enjoyed even 'the slightest pecuniary interest' in the outcome
of the trial." ' In other words, despite the judge's relationship with
the attorney and the possible risk of bias, the court found no
constitutional violation because the judge had no direct financial
interest in the outcome.
This decision comports with United States Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has adopted the common law standard
that any direct pecuniary interest in a case, no matter how minimal,
constitutionally mandates recusal. 6 This standard implies that no
person can fairly judge his or her own case. The Court has rejected,
however, the notion that a breach of judicial impartiality based

*
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1. Texaco v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 842 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. dismissed,
108 S. Ct. 1305 (1988).
2. Texaco v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Supplemental Fact
Findings).
3. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
4. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
5. Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 845.
6. See Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608).
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on bias7 or familial relationship with a litigant undermines traditional notions of justice to the degree of a constitutional violation.'
Because, as the Court noted in Patterson v. New York, 9 it is
normally "within the power of the State to regulate procedures
under which its laws are carried out," and its decision in this
regard is not subject to proscription under the due process clause
unless "it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"' 0 such a violation can be controlled only by statute.
This Article contends that existing standards governing the due
process clause prohibition of judicial improprieties are insufficiently broad, inconsistent, and inadequate. For example, in In re
New Mexico Gas Antitrust Litigation," the Tenth Circuit held that
a judge possessing only negligible amounts of stock in a corporation that is a party to a suit is sufficiently partial to mandate
recusal. The court stated that "recusal would be required by the
statute if the judge owned even one share of stock in a party to
the litigation.' '1 2 Yet in Laird v. Tatum, 3 Justice Rehnquist stated
that his expression of legal views on the merits of a case during
prior governmental service did not render him incapable of giving
both litigants a fair hearing. 14 This Article attempts to show, by
examining the philosphical basis of due process, that such a
disparate approach to recusal is unacceptable. Two concepts of
due process have been widely accepted; both are problematic, and
neither offers an adequate explanation for current recusal standards
nor a sound foundation upon which to build a more comprehensive
standard. Under the first concept, instrumental due process, a
major goal of process is to facilitate efficiency in dealing with
substantive rights.15 The second concept, intrinsic due process,
maintains that procedure serves to protect the fundamental rights
inherent in any litigant. 6 Because neither of these concepts serves
7. Bias may be defined as any feeling not based on judicial philosophy which may
predispose a judge.
8. See generally Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (personal bias
and prejudice insufficient to establish constitutional violation).
9. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
10. Id. at 201-02 (citations omitted).
11. 620 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980).
12. Id. at 796 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4)(1982)).
13. 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.).
14. Id. at 836.
15. See generally Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
16. See generally Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value,
44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
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as an effective basis for due process, this Article will propose a
new concept, central to due process, that could serve as the basis
for a new theory of recusal. This view of due process will be
called systemic due process, and it professes that a fair system is
a fundamental prerequisite to a fair result. Hence, the principal
focus of this concept is on preserving the essence of the system.
Systemic due process will serve as the basis for an expansive and
uniform system of rules designed to regulate potential judicial
improprieties.

II.

HISTORY

Historically, at common law, judges were disqualified for financial interest in a case. 7 The desirability of a judge's complete
independence from a case dates back to the eleventh century, when
the distinction arose between one's personal knowledge and duties
(ut homo) and one's professional knowledge and duties (utjudex).5
Although Blackstone rejected the need for legal constraints on
judicial partiality, stating that "[t]he law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends
upon that presumption and idea,"' 19 the law was generally clear
that any financial interest was enough to disqualify a judge. The
sole exception to this firm standard was the "rule of necessity,"
under which a judge could not decline to sit where no adequate
substitute could be found. 20 Under this exception the rule of
disqualification yielded to the litigant's right to obtain a trial.2'
The common law standard was adopted in the United States as
22
early as 1813, when Chief Justice Marshall disqualified himself.
The modern standard for disqualification was declared by the
Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio.23 In Tumey, the mayor of an
Ohio town, who also acted as a judge, had the power to fine and
then use the revenue from the fines for city purposes. Chief Justice
Taft, after stating that abuse of neither interest nor relationship
rises to a constitutional level, held that direct financial interest in

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
757-58
22.
White,
(1984).
23.

See Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608).
See M. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 30 (1986).
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361.
See Frank, Disqualificationof Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 611 (1947).
See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
(1979).
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813). See also
The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1, 12-13 n.50
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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a case violates the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 24
Furthermore, he enunciated the following standard for determining
when such a violation has occurred:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the

defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear,
and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process
of law.2

In In re Murchison,26 the Supreme Court elaborated on the
concept laid out in Tumey. In this decision, Justice Black stressed
that even the possibility of unfairness caused by a judge's interest
in the case should not be tolerated:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability [sic] of unfairness .... Such a stringent rule may sometimes
bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who do their very best
to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But
to perform its high function
in the best way, "justice must satisfy the
27
appearance of justice."

In 1972, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Tumey standard in
Ward v. Village of Monroeville.2" In this case, the village mayor
was allowed to levy fines for certain ordinance and traffic violations, and the money collected constituted a substantial part of
the village's revenue. Justice Brennan applied the Tumey standard
although the pecuniary interest of the decisionmaker was not

direct .29

Recently, in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,30 the Supreme
Court stated that due process forbids judges from hearing cases
in which they have a financial interest. 3 In Aetna, an Alabama
Supreme Court justice took part in a per curiam decision regarding
an insurance company when he was personally involved in similar
pending insurance litigation.32 The United States Supreme Court
found that the per curiam decision was not based on existing
precedent, and thus the state court justice had effectively created

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 523.
Id. at 532.
349 U.S. 133 (1955).
Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
409 U.S. 57 (1972).
Id. at 60.
475 U.S. 813 (1986).
Id.at 821-22.
Id.at 823-24.
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new law with precedential value to govern his own case. Therefore,
a due process violation had occurred.
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Aetna reaffirmed that while
a judge's financial interest in a case violates the Constitution,
neither bias nor relationship with a party in the case constitutes
such a violation. The Aetna Court quoted Tumey in holding that
"not '[aill questions of judicial qualification . . . involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state
policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters
merely of legislative discretion.' ""
Due process protections have not been sufficiently broad in the
area of recusal. Significant opposing arguments have, however,
been made for limiting the situations that require judicial disqualification. First, concern exists that disqualification of many judges
might undermine public confidence in the judiciary.34 Second,
frequent judicial disqualification, as well as the necessary accompanying litigation, would limit the efficiency of the administration
of justice." Third, litigants may "judge shop" by manipulating
36
an overly liberal disqualification standard to their advantage.
Finally, at the United States Supreme Court level, a strict disqualification standard could potentially prevent cases from being
38
decided," because the necessary quorum requires six justices.
Although effective arguments exist for limiting the scope of
judicial disqualification, none explain the Supreme Court's rationale for confining due process violations to financial interest, while
excluding violations of bias or familial relationship. Little justification can be discerned for the narrow rule except the clear
advantages of a bright-line distinction; certainly political bias or a
judge's familial relationship with a litigant endangers judicial legitimacy as much as a small financial interest in the case.
Judicial prejudice based not only on financial interest, but also
on bias or relationship, is antithetical to the rule of law.39 The
33. Id. at 820 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)); See also FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948) ("most matters relating to judicial disqualification
[do] not rise to a constitutional level"); Clyma v. Kennedy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 A. 539 (1894)
(at common law, a judge was not disqualified for prejudice or bias, in a criminal libel
case, even though the judge was the person libeled).
34. See Note, Disqualificationof Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HAiv.
L. Rav. 736, 747 (1973).
35. See generally, Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. REs. 662, 664 (1985).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
39. See generally R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIETY 192-200 (1976).
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Supreme Court's language in Tumey implies as much, stating that
"[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
' 4
average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required"
constitutes a due process violation. Yet the Court has limited
judicial recusal to the area of pecuniary interest, causing inequities
to become commonplace in the case law. Thus, while courts have
repeatedly held that any amount of financial interest in a case
mandates recusal, 41 grossly biased decisionmakers have been allowed to try cases.
For example, although a judge cannot hear an appeal from a
case tried by that judge, 42 a federal trial judge in Antonello v.
Wunsch 43 refused to disqualify himself from a case when the
constitutionality of a decision he joined while on the Kansas
Supreme Court was in question. The Tenth Circuit affirmed that
his actions were appropriate, giving him license to determine the
constitutionality of his own past decision. 44 Similarly, in Phillips
v. Joint Legislative Committee on Performance and Expenditure
Review, 41 the Fifth Circuit allowed a trial judge to hear a civil
rights suit although his past remarks "[a]t times . . . reflected
racial reactions not only outmoded but improper."
Conversely, judges have recused themselves unnecessarily to
insure the appearance of justice. Little distinguishes cases where
disqualification occurred from those in which it did not. An
example of the former type of case is Public Utilities Commission
v. Pollak, 47 which involved a first amendment challenge to the
playing of radios in Washington buses and street cars. Justice
Frankfurter disqualified himself because his dislike of such music
made him unable to hear the case. He added:
When there is ground for believing that ... unconscious feelings may
operate in the ultimate judgment, or may not . .. unfairly lead others
to believe they are operating, judges recuse themselves ....
The guiding

40.

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).

41.

See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'd mem. sub

nom. Arizona v. United States Dist. Ct., 459 U.S. 1191 (1983); see also H.R. REP. No.
1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6351,
6356 ("a financial interest is defined as any legal or equitable interest, 'however small')
(emphasis in original).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1982) ("No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the
decision of a case or issue tried by him.").
43. 500 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1974).

44.

Id. at 1262-63.

45.

637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960, 971 (1982).

46.

Id.at 1020.

47.

343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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consideration is that the administration of justice should reasonably
appear to be disinterested as well as be so in fact.
This case for me presents such a situation. My feelings are so strongly
engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy that I had better not
participate in judicial judgment upon it.41

In contrast to the Texaco case, a Florida court in Caleffe v.
Vitale 9 required recusal where a lawyer ran the re-election campaign of the judge, holding that "[clommon sense tells us that
this alone would give rise to a reasonable fear on the petitioner's

part that a conflict of interest may exist." 5 Such inconsistencies
and inequities suggest that the current due process jurisprudence

governing recusal has not successfully produced an acceptable
disqualification standard.
III.

THE STATUTORY ENACTMENTS

In response to the historical inadequacies of due process recusal
jurisprudence, 5 Congress has enacted legislation pertaining to standards for disqualification. The first legislation was enacted in 1792,
requiring disqualification of district judges in cases where they
were "concerned in interest" or had "been of counsel." 5 2 The
current federal statutory enactment of recusal standards is based
explicitly on the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct ("Code"). Canon 3(C) of the Code establishes that judges
should disqualify themselves if impartiality might reasonably be
questioned in four areas: bias, past legal service, financial interest,
and relationship." The decision to use the word "might" was

48.
49.

Id. at 466-67.
488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).

50.

Id. at 629.

51.

See generally H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
& ADmiN. NEws 6351, 6351-55.
52. For the evolution of the original act, see Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1
Stat. 275, 278-79; Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 455 (1982)); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1982)); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1087,
1090 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982)); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62
Stat. 907, 908 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982)); Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982)); Act of
Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title X, § 1007, 102 Stat. 4667 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982)).
53. The text of Canon 3(C) states, in pertinent part:
DISQUALIFICATION
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
CODE CONG.
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intended to establish a reasonable person standard for disqualification: if a reasonable person knowing all of the circumstances
would doubt the judges' impartiality, then the judges should recuse
4

themselves .

Drawing heavily from the Code, in 1974 Congress amended the
basic statutory provision governing judicial disqualification" to
conform to the ABA Code on the questions of bias, relationship,
and interest.5 6 The strict provisions of the Code were designed to
promote public confidence in the judiciary and to eliminate the
"duty to sit." 7 Section 455 reads in part:
Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate.
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge
or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning
the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the

knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom
he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning
the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning
it;

(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor
child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) (1972).
54. See E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60 (1973).
55.

28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982).
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONo.
& ADMIN. Naws 6351, 6351.
57. Id. at 6355.

56.
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particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of
a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding. 8

Congress has clearly imposed a far more demanding standard
for judicial disqualification than the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause, and courts have recognized this. For example, in
Margoles v. Johns,5 9 the Seventh Circuit held that "[slection 455
goes beyond 'due process.' Its requirement of avoiding even the
appearance of partiality, even though bias or prejudice does not
exist, is based on considerations over and above constitutional
standards." 60 Additionally, Congress deemed a violation of bias
or relationship equal to a violation of financial interest.
Although this statute is encompassing, it has not eliminated the
apparent inequities regarding recusal in the case law. For example,
in United States v. Harrelson,61 a judge who was a friend of a
murdered judge was allowed to sit in the trial of the alleged killer.
The Fifth Circuit held that although the trial judge might feel
hostility toward the actual killer, his ability to try the defendant
impartially would not be affected. 62 This holding contradicts section
455(a), which states that a judge should "disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. '63 Because of the judge's potential animosity toward the
defendant, it is reasonable to question the judge's impartiality,
thus mandating recusal from the case.
Part of the problem with current recusal jurisprudence stems
from an improper philosophical basis for the due process clause.

58.
59.
(1982).
60.
.61.
(1985).
62.
63.

28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (1982).
660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909
Id. at 296.
754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1034
Id. at 1166.
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982).
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The two elements widely accepted as central to the basis of the
due process clause are both inadequate grounds for due process
jurisprudence. After analyzing these two elements, the Article will
suggest that a third element is vital to properly understand the
due process clause. Finally, recusal jurisprudence will be examined
in light of this third element to suggest a new disqualification
standard based entirely upon the fourteenth amendment.

IV.

THREE CONCEPTS OF DUE PROCESS

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment functions
broadly as a concept, instead of as a conception. As Ronald
Dworkin has made clear, the distinction delineates the broad
concept of fairness from any given, specific conception of what is
fair. That is, when one says "Act fairly," one intends that the
person be guided by a broader theory of fairness than any particulars the speaker may have had in mind.64
In keeping with such a theory, the due process clause was made
deliberately vague by the framers of the Constitution. 6 Although
the due process clause has occasionally been interpreted to protect
only the specific rights envisioned at its inception, its ambiguity
has led subsequent case law to label this view as antithetical to
the framers' intent. 6 For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted the breadth and the flexibility of the due process
clause: "The very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation. '67 Although due process is broad, it must also be capable
of uniform and fair application for it to be meaningful as a right.
Neither instrumental nor intrinsic due process provides an adequate
framework to achieve a fair and uniform due process jurisprudence
to govern fourteenth amendment protections from judical partiality.
A.

Instrumental Due Process

Under the instrumental view of due process, procedures are
purely a means to serve the social utility by accurately and efficiently achieving substantive results .61 This standard contemplates

See R. DwoRKiN, TAKING RIOHTS SERIOUSLY 133-35 (1977).
65. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 90-103 (1980).
66. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972).
67. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
68. See Posner, supra note 15.
64.
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more than merely arriving at the truth; it emphasizes reaching the
truth in a manner comporting with the social utility. Hence, the
instrumental concept of due process primarily values a procedural
system designed to arrive at truth in the most direct manner
possible.
Under this theory, procedure serves to maximize the social utility
by minimizing two kinds of costs. The first form of cost may be
called "error costs": intangible societal costs expended as the result
of an inaccurate judicial system, which may be calculated as the
product of the probability of error and the societal cost of error
if it occurs. The second form of cost is the increased direct cost
to society that is imposed through the error in the litigation,
including attorneys' fees, court fees, and the loss of the litigant's
time.6 9
Instrumental due process determines what procedures to afford
by weighing the cost of procedural errors against the direct cost
of error correction to the system. Because the goal is to maximize
social utility, the direct costs to society should not be greater than
the amount that would be saved by detecting and remedying the
error. Thus, if a procedural safeguard will protect a litigant in an
amount that could be quantified as "x," but the direct costs to
society to impose the safeguard will be "x + 1," instrumental due
process would refuse the litigant the procedural safeguard. 70 For
example, to disqualify a judge whose impartiality is in question,
the additional direct cost to society, such as administrative costs
and lawyers' fees, must be less than the economically measured
cost to society and to the litigant of a potentially unfair trial.
The Supreme Court adopted a form of instrumental due process
in Mathews v. Eldridge.7' The issue in Mathews concerned whether
an individual has a right to an evidentiary hearing prior to the
termination of Social Security disability benefits. The Supreme
Court set out a three-pronged test for social cost accounting to
determine when a litigant should receive a procedurally protected
right:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.' 2

69.

Id. at 399-401.

70.

Id. at 401.

71. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
72. Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
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Thus, under the Supreme Court's formula, procedural protections will be guaranteed only if the product of the increased
accuracy from additional procedures and the interest of the claimant is greater than the value lost by increasing the government's
burden. For example, applying the Mathews standard to a hypothetical recusal case yields the following multistep process to determine when social utility mandates judicial disqualification: (1)
the loss of the litigant's right to a fair tribunal must be quantified;
(2) the ability of a biased judge, who is predisposed on the merits
of the case because of extra-legal considerations, to fairly weigh
the equities in a case must be assessed; (3) a quantification of the
possible loss to the government and to society at large must be
calculated. Then, if the loss to the litigant multiplied by the
likelihood of judicial partiality is greater than the increased governmental burden, the litigant would obtain the right to a fair
tribunal, and the judge would be disqualified.
Although efficiency is a relevant factor in a due process determination, emphasizing efficiency at the exclusion of other values
is problematic. First, this form of utilitarian social cost-accounting
attempts to quantify that which is inherently unquantifiable, for
example, the true societal cost of procedural protections and the
corresponding loss of litigants' rights if such protections are denied. 73 In addition, in determining this calculus, "soft" variables
such as individual dignity are minimized, and complexities are
simplified in favor of more easily cognizable conceptions of the
public good.1 4 For example, courts have held both that disqualification of judges may be required by a "circumspect and punctilious devotion to the ideal of justice in the abstract as it appears
to the public at large ' 75 and that due process entitles a person to
an impartial tribunal which "preserves both the appearance and
reality of fairness." 7 6 The fundamental importance of the appearance of justice, however, is precisely the type of "soft" variable
that social cost accounting may ignore in making its utilitarian
calculation.
More significantly, instrumental due process potentially limits
the due process clause in favor of broader societal objectives. The
due process clause was intended to protect individual liberty from

73. See Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Towards a More Responsive Approach
to Procedural Protections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 155 (1978). See also Note, Specifying
the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest
Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1510, 1519 (1975).
74. See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 48; Saphire, supra note 73, at 155.
75. United States v. Zarowitz, 326 F. Supp. 90, 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
76. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
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majority tyranny." Therefore, to meaningfully deem due process
a fundamental right, the individual who invokes the fundamental
right must be able to uphold it against all but the most compelling
government interests . 78 The interest-balancing, instrumental approach implies, however, that the government can eliminate procedures as long as its definition of the social utility is met.
Those who accept instrumental due process define the social
utility in terms of processing legal administration with the greatest
possible efficiency. The Supreme Court has denied such a repugnant view of due process by stating that the fundamental nature
of due process insulates it from limitations solely to increase
efficiency. The Court has held, for example, that "[p]rocedural
due process is not intended to promote efficiency;" 7 9 procedural
protections must be provided "if that may be done without prohibitive cost;" 0 and
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate
state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in
general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones."

Because instrumental due process attempts to minimize fundamental due process rights to obtain efficiency gains, it cannot be
a dominant element of due process jurisprudence. Furthermore,
instrumental due process neither explains current recusal standards
nor suggests a more desirable standard. If due process serves
primarily to promote efficiency, it remains unclear why financial
interest violates the fourteenth amendment while bias and relationship abuses do not. To be as efficient as possible, judges would
be disqualified only when they were completely incapable of rendering impartial justice; any other situation would waste administrative resources for a mere speculative gain in procedural fairness.
Therefore, under the instrumental concept, not only should the
fourteenth amendment's coverage exclude bias and relationship, it
should also be narrowed to eliminate financial interest from its
general scope. To obtain efficiency, only a judicial confession of

77.
78.
79.

See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 48-49. See also Note, supra note 73, at 1543.
See R. DWORKIN, supra note 64, at 190-92.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972).

80. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (emphasis added).
81.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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impermissible bias would be sufficient to mandate disqualification.
Because such a theory would cast serious doubts upon the appearance of justice, the instrumental concept of due process seems
an inadequate basis for recusal standards.
B.

Intrinsic Due Process

Under the concept of intrinsic due process, certain rights are so
fundamental that they cannot be denied to a participant in our
democratic process. This notion derives from Kant's second form
of the Categorical Imperative, that no man should be treated solely
as a means." 2 From this basic precept follows the notion of
individual liberty. 83 Such a view rejects the theory of utilitarian
cost accounting, presumptively favoring the preservation of the
inherent rights of the litigant against all challenges.
While recognizing other values, intrinsic due process places its
principal emphasis upon the preservation of the rights and human
dignity of each litigant. It emphasizes that individual participation
in government, humane treatment of citizens, and fundamental
fairness to litigants are such vital elements of dignity that they
must be protected from attacks by all but the most compelling
competing values. Thus, intrinsic due process delegates to secondary status that which instrumental due process regards as primary.
The Supreme Court has given its support to the intrinsic due
process concept on several occasions. For example, in Twining v.
New Jersey,84 the Court held that the conception of due process
includes any "fundamental principle of liberty and justice which
inheres in the very idea of free government and is the inalienable
right of a citizen of such a government." 5
More recently, the Supreme Court adopted a similar view in
Goldberg v. Kelly,8 6 a case whose fundamental values were challenged by Mathews six years later. Goldberg analyzed whether
termination of a recipient's public assistance payments without a
pretermination evidentiary hearing constituted a due process violation.8 7 The Court, while recognizing the existence of a significant
state interest in conserving fiscal and administrative resources, held

82. I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 90-91 (H.J. Paton trans.
1966).
83. Pennock, Introduction to DUE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII at xix (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1977).
84. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
85. Id. at 106.
86. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
87. Id. at 260.
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that the recipient's need for financial support and fundamental
dignity mandated a pretermination hearing; thus, due process had
been violated."
Although perhaps more intuitively attractive than instrumental
due process, intrinsic due process suffers from the narrowness of
its scope. First, courts have long held that a sufficiently significant
governmental interest may curtail any "absolute" right. For example, in Schenck v. United States,8 9 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the proper balance between individual rights and the
public interest, stating that "[tihe most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic." 9 Thus, while intrinsic due process may in
theory seem absolute, in practice, certain "absolute" rights must
occasionally yield to the necessity of other fundamental societal
interests. Second, the intrinsic model depends upon the assumption that "intrinsic" rights are discernible. Yet as the theory
of natural law continues to wane, agreement regarding what is
"fundamentally fair" has been questioned, and identifying inherent
rights is increasingly considered radically subjective. As Justice
Black stated in his lengthy dissent in Adamson v. California,9'
I would not reaffirm the Twining decision. I think that decision and
the "natural law" theory of the Constitution upon which it relies degrade
the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and simultaneously
appropriate for this Court a broad
power which we are not authorized
92
by the Constitution to exercise.

Given both the nonabsolute nature of "intrinsic" rights and the
belief that such rights may not be discernible, the intrinsic concept
is an ineffective basis upon which to rest due process. The problems
stemming from this concept can be illustrated through a recusal
example. Consider a judge whose brother was formerly an associate
at the law firm representing one of the litigants. Also, suppose
that this fact becomes known only toward the end of an eightweek trial. The judge claims that this does not predispose him in
the case. Intrinsic due process requires recusal. Under such circumstances, however, even if some slight possibility of bias is suspected,
it is difficult to justify mandatory recusal. Given the large administrative cost of retrying the case and the negligible connection

88. Id. at 264-66.
89.

249 U.S. 47 (1919).

90. Id. at 52.
91. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
92. Id. at 70 (Black, J., dissenting). See also, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
(1961).
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between the judge and a party, running the minimal risk of a
tainted trial is a rational choice.
The intrinsic concept of due process cannot successfully explain
the rationale behind existing recusal standards. Contrary to the
instrumental view, the intrinsic notion implies that the fourteenth
amendment should protect against all possible abuses of judicial
impartiality. No mere administrative savings can be compelling
enough under this theory to justify the potential forfeiture of a
litigant's fundamental right to a fair forum, even if the odds of
an actual forfeiture are minimal. The intrinsic theory of due process
should, therefore, protect against alleged bias and familial relationship in addition to financial interest.
The problem with this theory is that it does not differentiate
between degrees of bias. Although it is reasonable to disqualify a
judge'who has a $1,000,000 financial interest in the outcome of a
case regardless of societal cost, it is less clear why a judge who
has a $1 financial interest should be disqualified when disqualification would be equally costly. This absolute approach to due
process protections makes the intrinsic concept a troublesome basis
for the fourteenth amendment.
C. Systemic Due Process
The systemic concept of due process, while recognizing the
importance of efficiency and preservation of individual rights,
embodies the notion that procedure in itself has value, and thus
process must protect the procedural system. Although a process
may hold at its core many values, such as participatory governance,
humaneness, and procedural rationality, 93 no substantive result can
94
be legitimate unless it stems from fair procedures.
The fundamental importance of government interest in preserving the appropriate process has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
For example, although Farettav. California95 guaranteed a criminal
defendant the right to proceed pro se, the Supreme Court held in
McKaskle v. Wiggins 6 that a court may appoint standby counsel
against a defendant's will to assist the judge in enforcing courtroom
protocol and to aid in maintaining courtroom procedures. Under
these circumstances, the sixth amendment right guaranteed by
Faretta was modified to assure appropriate process.

93. See
Values, " 60
94. See
95. 422
96. 465

Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process
L. REV. 1, 4 (1974).
Saphire, supra note 73, at 124-25.
U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
U.S. 168, 184 (1984).
CORNELL
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Justices Marshall and White advanced similar arguments in their
respective dissents in the Gary Gilmore case. 97 The Supreme Court
refused to continue a stay of execution requested by Gilmore's
mother as "next friend," finding that Gilmore had waived his
eighth amendment rights. Justice Marshall argued that the eighth
amendment not only protects individuals, but also extends to
protect society as a whole against the administration of cruel and
unusual punishment. 9 Justice White's dissent implied that the
eighth amendment also protects the vital interest in maintaining
the appropriate structure and functioning of the legal system.
Justice White believed that serious questions existed regarding the
constitutionality of the Utah death penalty statute, and this fundamental issue could not be ignored solely because the defendant
chose to do so:
[T]here are substantial questions under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), about the constitutionality of the Utah death penalty statute.
Because of Gary Gilmore's purported waiver of his right to challenge
the statute, none of these questions was resolved in the Utah courts. I
believe, however, that the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal
case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Until the state courts have resolved
the obvious, serious doubts about the validity of the state statute, the
imposition of the death penalty in this case should be stayed.-

The desire to protect procedure extends to due process protections in the civil realm as well. One prominent area in which
procedure has received recent attention is personal jurisdiction. In
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, I10 the Supreme Court
held that the state of Oklahoma could not, consistent with the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, exert in personam
jurisdiction over a car distributor incorporated in New York, whose
only Oklahoma connection was its sale of an automobile in New
York that was later involved in an accident in Oklahoma. The
Court declared that larger, systemic interests were involved to
protect process, and that these interests take precedence over
efficiency of the adjudication, the interests of Oklahoma, and the
convenience of the litigants:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the

forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;

97. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1017-19 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); id. at
1019-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98.

Id.at 1019.

99.
100.

Id. at 1017-18 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
444 U.S. 286, 288, 299 (1980).
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even if the forum State is the most convenient location for the litigation,
the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism,
may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.'

Justice Brennan's dissent asserted a different form of the systemic position in World-Wide Volkswagen. He suggested that a

state has interests in protecting its citizens and maintaining the
structure of its judicial administration.10 2 These interests are sufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction if the litigation properly falls
within the scope of the state's judicial structure. 03 This notion has
become dominant in subsequent cases involving personal jurisdiction. ,04
A justification for the importance of the preservation of fair
and uniform procedures can be illustrated by examining four

differing
law, the
the role
ensuring

areas: the nature of the Constitution, the moral basis for
structure of an effectively functioning legal system, and
of courts in society. The Constitution itself begins by
a durable structure. Indeed, the framers were so obsessed

with assuring appropriate procedure that provisions governing

process dominate the Bill of Rights.0 5 One commentator stated:
[t]he body of the original Constitution is devoted almost entirely to
structure, explaining who among the various actors-federal government,
state government; Congress, executive, judiciary-has authority to do
what, and going on to fill in a good bit of detail about how these
persons are to be selected and to conduct their business. Even provisions
that at first glance might seem primarily designed to assure or preclude
certain substantive results seem on reflection to be principally concerned
with process.
The prohibitions against granting title of nobility seem rather plainly to
have been designed to buttress the democratic ideal that all are equals
in government. The Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses prove
on analysis to be separation of powers provisions, enjoining the legislature to act prospectively and by general rule ....
[T]he Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and at least in one aspect . . . the

101. Id. at 294 (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 300, 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 299-300.
104. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777-78 (1984).
105. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
106. J. ELY, supra note 65, at 90. See also Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure,
63 Tax. L. REv. 579, 587 (1984) ("The Framers of the Bill of Rights were not just
interested in procedure; they were obsessed by it. Provisions governing court procedures
dominate the Bill of Rights much more than a student of political philosophy would
expect.").
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Commerce Clause as well, function as equality provisions, guaranteeing
virtual representation to the politically powerless. 07

In addition, one scholar noted that: "As a charter of government
a constitution must prescribe legitimate processes, not legitimate
outcomes, if like ours (and unlike more ideological documents
elsewhere) it is to serve many generations through changing
times."'10 The desire to insure the purity of process thus underlies
the structure of the Constitution, for our government malfunctions
when process, rather than substantive decision-making, is undeserving of our trust.1°9
The need for uniformity of process is further evident in the
moral realm, because such consistency serves as an ethical foundation for justifying a rule of law. Lon Fuller identifies constancy
in the law-as one of the eight features upon which a morally
justifiable rule of law depends." 0 Fuller claims that one way for
a legal system to fail is to introduce "such frequent changes in
the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them."'1
The moral foundation of law requires the law to remain reasonably
constant and to be applied equally to all." 2 Therefore, procedures
must exist that will provide consistent rules.
For a rule of law to be recognized as legitimate, individuals
must have rights against institutions that exercise arbitrary power
over them." 3 The less defined the government's procedures to
invoke this power, the more arbitrary and thus less legitimate the
exercise of power appears. The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment "aims to provide some assurance of nonarbitrariness
by requiring those who exercise authority to justify their intended
actions in a public proceeding by adducing reasons of the appropriate sort and defending these against critical attack."" t 14 Welldefined and consistently applied procedures insure the moral legitimacy of law by protecting against its arbitrary use. This moral
consideration has played a central role in the history of modern
political thought. As John Locke stated long ago: "This Freedom
from Absolute, Arbitrary Power is so necessary to, and closely

107.

J.

108.

Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 254 (1976).
J. ELY, supra note 65, at 103.
See generally L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969).

ELY,

supra note 65, at 90-91 (footnotes omitted).

109.
110.
Ill. Id.at 39.
112. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
also Leubsdorf, supra note 106, at 594.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

629-32 (2d ed. 1988); see

113. Scanlon, Due Process, in DuE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII 99 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman, eds. 1977).
114. Id.at 96.
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joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with it but
by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together.""' 5
It has also been argued that concerns for an effectively functioning system mandate the preservation of process." 6 Under such
a view, the system provides long-term societal benefits in that it
establishes a stable mechanism by means of which the collective
can effectively operate." 7 This allows society to enjoy benefits that
accrue only by means of a collective sustained effort, such as
allowing officials to exercise discretion, providing for governance
by consistent rules, and assuring that individuals retain confidence
in the system.
Under this structure, due process ensures fundamental fairness
by protecting the structure of a fair system, and thus provides
uniform results in similar cases. Due process procedures are designed to guarantee that the community will be informed of the
condition of the system. This information is necessary to ensure
that people are confident that their collective aims are being
pursued through the system and that safeguards exist to limit some
of the risks inherent in the systemic process."' Under this theory,
those who view themselves as potentially most seriously harmed
by a systemic malfunction can be relied on to monitor its procedures.
Due process is thus conceptually tied to normative systems and what is
due is to be discerned by attending to the special requirements of system.
The dominant concern, then, is to process system, to institute procedures
that will attend to the special vulnerabilities of system while preserving
its valuable capacity to coordinate action, to reinforce or amplify the
efficacy of individual effort, to respond adaptively and resourcefully in
the face of changing circumstances, interests or needs.' 9

This view of primarily maintaining the procedures of the judicial
system emphasizes the common interest of each individual in
assuring a properly functioning system, because only such a system
can ultimately protect individual rights.
A final argument for the justification of systemic due process
arises from the role of courts within the fabric of American society.
In this country, use of the courts is the primary, and at times the
only way to resolve disputes. The ability of private parties to

115. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 284 (P. Laslett Stud. ed. 1988) (3d ed.
1698).
116. Kearns, On De-Moralizing Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: Nomos XVIII 229 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman, eds. 1977).
117. Id.at 240.
118.

Id. at 241-42.

119.

Id. at 244.
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interact depends upon their belief that the available dispute-resolving mechanisms will use fair and standard rules to serve as neutral
guidelines. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Boddie v. Connecticut,120 this is vital to the functioning of society:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more
fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules
defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to
govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly,
predictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social organization
and cohesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to seek regularized
resolution of conflicts individuals are capable of interdependent action
that enables them to strive for achievements without the anxieties that
would beset them in a disorganized society. Put more succinctly, it is
this injection of the rule of law that allows society to reap the2 benefits
of rejecting what political theorists call the "state of nature.' '

Under such a scheme, consistent and neutrally applied principles
are needed to preserve the social advantages of the rule of law.
The due process clause insures this preservation:
Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his rights,
'neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State's
monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly
be said to be acceptable under our scheme of things. Only by providing
that the social enforcement mechanism must function strictly within
these 22bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society that is also
just.

V.

THE ELEMENTS OF A JUST PROCESS

Underlying the notion of preservation of the system are certain
value judgments regarding what constitutes a good system. To
determine what is to be valued, a two-step process is required.
The first element considers whether the given aspect of the process
helps to achieve the desirable result. The second element extends
beyond this to determine the value of the procedure as a procedure,
because the 23achievement of desirable ends does not always justify
1
the means.
To maintain the system, a desirable element must have two
features. First, it must be uniformly applicable. Second, the implementation of the element must not alter the basic structure of
the process. Under systemic due process, any procedural element
that satisfies these criteria will be considered a "fair" and "just"

120. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
121.
122.
123.

Id.at 374.
Id.at 375.
See generally Summers, supra note 93.
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element of the legal process, and the sum of these elements will
constitute a fair system.
Fundamentally related to the concept of a fair and just system
is the public's perception that the system is pure and just. Indeed,
a major distinction between systemic due process and the instrumental and intrinsic concepts is that the systemic view, by assuring
a fair system, significantly maintains the appearance as well as the
reality of propriety. As Balzac once noted: "To distrust the
judiciary marks the beginning of the end of society. Smash the
present patterns of the institution, rebuild it on a different basis
...
but don't stop believing in it."124 The notion of public
confidence, however, is problematic. If public confidence is defined
as the perception of a neutral, detached decisionmaker rendering
decisions according to external standards applied neutrally, a lack
of public confidence in the judiciary dates as far back as John
Adams's appointment of Chief Justice John Marshall and the
Justice's decision in Marbury v. Madison. 25 Also, the appearance
of justice is manipulable, because it clearly depends upon the
definition of justice. A procedural element may appear to be
unjust solely because of a misunderstanding that distorts the public's perception. Correcting the appearance of impropriety by altering the common perception to fit the existing standard would
be as legitimate as attempting to change the standard to align it
with the publicly held belief. Perhaps only the ease with which
such a change can be accomplished accounts for the belief that
the latter rather than the former is the appropriate approach. Yet
systemic due process does give the public confidence in the workings of the judicial apparatus. As the court noted in Webbe v.
McGhie Land Title Co., 126 the fact that section 455 mandates
disqualification when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned shows that the appearance of impartiality is virtually
as important as actual impartiality. This is a point of grave
concern. Indeed, because the judiciary is "possessed of neither the
purse nor the sword,' ' 27 its dependence upon the public's willing2
ness to follow its dictates is fundamental.1 1

124.

0.

KIRCHHEMR, POLITICAL JUSTICE

175 (1961) (quoting H. BALZAC, SPLENDEURS

ET MIStRES).

125. Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 74. Marbury v. Madison was decided in 1803. Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803).
126. 549 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 1977).
127. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
128. See Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5 (1970).
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Therefore, the systemic concept of due process comports with
the nature of the Constitution. It recognizes the desirability of
such values as efficiency and individual dignity, but refuses to
sacrifice process considerations to achieve any single value. Systemic due process maintains that the only way to assure legitimacy
in a justice system is to guarantee that the procedural system
remains fair by applying its precepts uniformly and in a manner
that will not alter the system. The constancy and uniformity of
such a system thus help legitimize the rule of law.
VI.

A

SUBSTANTIVE REcuSAL STANDARD

The systemic view of due process suggests the need for stronger
recusal standards. Indeed, virtually every recent commentator except for Chief Justice Rehnquist 29 has agreed that the current
recusal standards enunciated in Tumey are insufficiently broad and
inconsistent. 30 Clearly, judges cannot be expected to be without
opinions before trial. As Justice Rehnquist stated in his memorandum regarding Laird v. Tatum, "[p]roof that a Justice's mind at
the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the
area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of
qualification, not lack of bias."'' It is meaningful, however, to
speak of an impartial judge. Systemic due process implies a twotiered standard to determine the necessary level of judicial impartiality.
The first test can be inferred from Judge Jerome Frank's decision
in In re Linahan, Inc.:132
Democracy must, indeed, fail unless our courts try cases fairly, and
there can be no fair trial before a judge lacking in impartiality and
disinterestedness. If, however, "bias" and "partiality" be defined to
mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then
no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will ....

[Wiere those

pre-judgments which we call habits absent in any person, were he obliged
to treat every event as an unprecedented crisis presenting a wholly new
problem he would go mad. Interests, points of view, preferences, are
the essence of living.133

129. Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28 REc. 694 (1973).
130. See generally, Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1970); Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 237 (1987); Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Participate
in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1973); Note, Judicial Disqualification in the
Federal Courts: A Proposal to Conform Statutory Provisions to Underlying Policies, 67
IOWA L. REV. 525 (1982).
131. 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,mem.).
132. 138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943).
133. Id. at 651-52.
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Judge Frank's statement raises the issue of which preferences
and viewpoints should be tolerated in a sitting judge. Because
maintaining a just system of uniform treatment is important, biases
that will influence a judge in nearly all cases are more acceptable
than those that will only affect certain decisions. Judge Frank
similarly distinguished between two types of preconceptions. The
first are preconceptions which "represent the community's most
cherished values and ideals" 134 and are part of the legal system
itself.135 "Such social pre-conceptions, the 'value judgments' which
members of any given society take for granted and use as the
unspoken axioms of thinking, find their way into that society's
legal system, become what has been termed 'the valuation system
of the law.' "1136 The second are preferences which are merely
"idiosyncratic" and "uniquely personal." While the latter are held
to be unacceptable biases, the former are not. Indeed, "[tjhe judge
in our society owes a duty to act in accordance with those basic

predilections inhering in our legal system ....

11"17

Because such

values are a part of society's fabric, judges must make their
determinations within the contours of society's values. This scheme
does not preclude prior legal philosophy and cultural background
as elements in the judge's decision; unlike personal prejudices,
these societal elements are unavoidably and uniformly applied to
all litigants and to any judicial decision. While the applicability of
such elements will vary from judge to judge, these effects are
unavoidable in a system that relies upon different people with
divergent backgrounds to make legal determinations.
The system does, however, demand judicial disqualification for
bias against an individual or a class of litigants. While this approach may produce majority tyranny, because "biases" accepted
by the community will be more acceptable than individual biases,
it assures that only widely accepted community values are allowable. It may even be desirable that such "majority tyranny" inheres
in the judiciary, because judges must work exclusively within
societal guidelines, as reflected in the Constitution and the state
law. While latitude in thinking is not only inevitable but desirable,
the basic values of a judge must fall within the scope of acceptable
societal values. The process of judicial confirmation attempts to
insure that judges' values are not outside the "mainstream" of

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 652 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
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American social thought, 3 ' as the 1987 Bork confirmation hearings
will attest.
For this theory to apply, a clear line must be drawn between
these two standards so that judges can consistently apply the law
to themselves. First, opinions that are based on legal philosophy
must be distinguished from those that are not. Next, judicial
preconceptions that are based on broad political ideology must be
separated from those that stem from feelings about a particular
litigant or the litigant's case. Finally, it must be determined whether
the judge's feelings will allow the judge to apply the law uniformly
to each litigant. Hence, a judge whose predispositions are legal in
origin, are broadly based and do not prevent him from adequately
applying the law will be allowed to hear the case. Conversely, if
a judge's bias toward a party stems from extra-legal sources, the
judge will be unable to apply the law equally and must be disqualified.
To illustrate this distinction, consider Phillips v. Joint Legislative
Committee on Performanceand Expenditure Review. 3 9 In Phillips,
employment discrimination actions were brought against three state
agencies. Although the trial judge had previously made numerous
remarks that "reflected racial reactions not only outmoded but
improper," which4 the appellate court found "unseemly" and did
"not condone,"'
the Fifth Circuit refused to disqualify the trial
judge for his prejudice against a class of litigants. The systemic
approach to recusal mandates the disqualification of such a judge,
because his attitudes were not shaped by legal philosophy but were
prejudice against the class of which the litigants
influenced by his
4
were members.1 '
The second standard for judicial disqualification states that no
judge may hear a case when a reasonable person would find the
judge potentially motivated by self-interest. 42 This broad standard
of self-interest encompasses elements of financial interest, relationship, and bias. For example, any financial interest or any benefit
to a family member could call into question judicial impartiality.

138.

For discussions regarding the judicial confirmation process, see generally L.

TRIBE,

GOD SAVE Tins HONORABLE COURT 77-92 (1985); Black, A Note on SenatorialConsideration

of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970); Grossman & Wasby, The Senate
and Supreme Court Nominations: Some Reflections, 1972 DUKE L.J. 557; Rees, Questions
for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17
GA. L. REV. 913 (1983).
139. 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960, 971 (1982).
140. Id.at 1020.
141. Clearly, in this case, an equal protection argument could also be made.
142. Leubsdorf, supra note 130, at 283-84.

HeinOnline -- 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 405 1989-1990

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

An example of the second standard's effect on recusal can be
illustrated by United States v. Sellers.' 43 In this case, the judge
was allowed to hear a bank robbery trial although the judge's
brother was chairman of the board of the bank at issue.'"* The
self-interest standard would mandate a different result. The familial
relationship between the judge and a victim creates a sufficient
question of bias to require disqualification.
Both of the recusal standards are justifiable under systemic due
process concerns. The systemic view requires that rules be uniformly applied to the greatest degree possible, and the proposed
two-tiered standard attempts to insure this by determining the
acceptable degree of judicial preconception. Under the first standard, allowing judicial opinions to stem from broad societal standards does not affect the consistent application of justice. Because
judges necessarily have beliefs before trial, it is important that
they do not discriminate against any individual. Existing judicial
philosophy and cultural values will be applied equally to all litigants, even if some litigants do not benefit or are equally harmed
by such values. Conversely, a judge's unique biases should not be
allowed to discriminate between litigants.
Under the proposed view, although not all litigants will actually
be treated equally, a discernible uniform standard will emerge.
This standard recognizes that certain preconceptions cannot be
eliminated, and it tolerates those that the entire judiciary will tend
to apply uniformly to all potential litigants. Likewise, under the
second standard, precluding judges from hearing cases in which
they might reasonably be presumed to be self-interested preserves
the constancy of the process. If cases can be decided based on
personal considerations, no recognizable standards will govern,
and the legitimacy
of the entire rule of law will be called into
45
question.
The two-tiered standard for judicial disqualification differs significantly from the current statutory enactment. The second feature
of the systemically based recusal standard is designed to encompass
the statutory standards for bias, interest, and relationship contained
in chapter 28, section 455 of the United States Title. The first part
of the systemic standard is designed to explicitly address the
problem that preconceptions are necessarily part of human nature,
and must inevitably remain part of the legal system.146 A distinction

143.
144.
145.
146.

566 F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 887.
Leubsdorf, supra note 130, at 283-84.
See supra note 133-137 and accompanying text.
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must therefore be drawn between those preconceptions that are
acceptable and those that are not. Some tendencies that a judge
possesses are grounded in judicial philosophy and are not only
inevitable, but may actually assist the fair consideration of the
equities in a given case. The systemic standard attempts to keep
the determination of bias meaningful by providing workable guidelines by which it can be measured. Therefore, more consistent
applications of recusal standards will be possible under this view
than could exist under the statutory enactment.
One final caution must be mentioned when considering recusal
standards. Recusal is unlike other due process concerns because,
in almost all cases, judges apply the law to themselves. 47 The sole
exception is contained in section 144 of the U.S. Code, which
allows litigants in district courts to file an affidavit alleging judicial
bias.' 4 This provision applies, however, only to federal district
court judges, and is generally not successful.' 49 Therefore, some
danger of judicial abuse will always exist. For any system of
judicial disqualification to function properly, the system must allow
for more meaningful appeals than the current standard, which
allows for reversal only for abuse of discretion."10
The two-tiered standard for recusal presented in this Article
suggests that many recent cases should have been decided differently. For example, in United States v. Pugliese,5 ' the Second
Circuit allowed a judge to hear a criminal trial although he stated
before the trial began, "I have a great deal of resentment for
people like these who are foreigners and come here and are involved
in crime .... This type of people [sic] are the worst things we
have .... .1 5 2 This judge was not only biased against a class of
which the defendant was allegedly a member, but he was obviously
predisposed to the merits of the case. Systemic recusal standards
would mandate disqualification in such a case, because it is reasonable to believe that the judge was unable to apply the criminal
law consistently and fairly to the defendant. Likewise, in Parrish

147. See Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982)).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982).
149. See generally Note, Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79
HARv. L. REv. 1435 (1966).

150. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
6351, 6355; see also United States v. Wilensky, 757 F.2d 594, 600
(3d Cir. 1985). For a thorough discussion of appellate remedies, see Moore, Appellate
Review of Judicial Disqualification Decisions in the Federal Courts, 35 HASTINcS L.J. 829
CONG. & ADmN. NEws

(1984).
151.
152.

805 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1119, 1125.
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v. Board of Commissioners,13 the Fifth Circuit held that a judge,
who had been president of an all-white bar association that integrated only after coming under public scrutiny, was not barred
from hearing a racial discrimination suit.
In addition, the existing disqualification standard makes it difficult to disqualify even the most blatantly biased judge. Three
federal appeals were needed to disqualify the trial judge in Walker
v. Lockhart,5 4 who instructed the deputy sheriff before the trial
that if the defendant "made a move to shoot him down, because
he didn't want him brought back to him because he intended to
burn the S.O.B. anyway."' 5 Disqualification was finally granted,
not so much because a due process violation had occurred but
largely because the bias supplemented the principal procedural
error, the failure to turn over exculpatory evidence. 5 6 Under the
systemic approach to judicial disqualification, a judge who has
predetermined the merits of a case is undoubtedly biased against
the individual defendant, and should be disqualified.
One additional area warranting special consideration under systemic recusal is the election of state court judges. The systemic
view implies that a judge should be recused whenever a lawyer or
a litigant in a case has contributed to the campaign of the judge,
either directly or through monetary donations. In this situation, a
reasonable person would question whether the judge's decision
would be affected by gratitude toward the contributor. Yet the
court in Texaco v. Pennzoil' allowed a judge to hear the case
although the lawyer for Pennzoil was the single largest contributor
to the trial judge's campaign.
To solve this apparent inequity, all members of the bar could
be prohibited from involvement in judicial election campaigns.
This would be difficult to enforce, however, and at best is only a
partial solution. Because systemic recusal standards suggest an
absolute ban against judges hearing cases involving their campaign
contributors, a more encompassing solution is needed. An increasing number of commentators have argued that states should solve
this problem by requiring selection of state judges exclusively by
appointment. 5 ' Many states have followed suit, and, at present,
153.
154.
155.
156.
(1985).

157.

524 F.2d 98, 104 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
726 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1222 (1984).
Id. at 1255 (testimony of witness at pretrial disqualification hearing).
See Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d 942, 960 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020

729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).

158. See generally, Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for Quality and Representativeness, 31 CASE W. RES. 409 (1981) (arguing that selection by committee rather than
by partisan elections also helps insure higher quality judges).
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twenty-seven states appoint their supreme court justices, thirteen
hold nonpartisan elections, and only ten hold the form of partisan
election that was involved in Texaco v. Pennzoil.5 9
Switching to a system of judicial appointment would not only
assist in the selection of better candidates, but would also avoid
the huge expense' 60 of campaigns and the impropriety of judges'
heavy dependence upon financial contributions from members of
the bar. Thus, systemic recusal considerations support elimination
of elections for state court judges.
Eliminating elected judges, however, may have serious repercussions. First, given the difficulty of deciding in advance who will
make a good state court judge,161 it is questionable whether merit
selection will improve the quality of the judiciary. In addition,
democratic ideals are lost when judges are appointed. For example,
to the degree that judicial accountability is deemed important, a
sacrifice is made when community input is lost. 162 In many states,
the concept of a "judge" arguably includes the notions of responsiveness and responsibility to the community. Also, public faith in
the judiciary may be sacrificed when judges can remain in office
without responding to societal standards. Although these arguments
are compelling, the heavy dependence of judicial elections on the
bar 163 requires some movement away from partisan elections to
insure judicial impartiality.
VII.

CONCLUSION

An independent and impartial decisionmaker is crucial to the
effective functioning of our justice system. As former California
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Traynor stated before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, "[a]n independent and honorable
judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should
participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should
himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity

and independence of the judiciary may be preserved."'

64

A biased

159.
160.

See N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1988, at B4, col. 3.
Approximately $1,000,000 is spent per candidate per election in Texas. Id. at col.

161.

See Aldisert, Erickson, Leflar & Roberts, What Makes a Good Appellate Judge?

5.

Four Views, JUDGES J., Spring 1983, at 14.
162. See Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The
Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, at 31, 34.
163. See, e.g., Watson, Observations on the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, 40 Sw.
L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, at 1.
164. Judicial Disqualification: Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
79-80 (1973) (statement of Hon. Roger J. Traynor, Chairman of ABA Spec. Comm. on
Standards of Judicial Conduct).
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judiciary threatens the legitimacy of the entire legal process. Over
one hundred years ago a court noted that lack of judicial impartiality extends beyond its effect on the parties to question the
integrity of the entire judicial system:
[T]he Court ought not to be astute to discover refined and subtle

distinctions to save a case from the operation of the maxim, ["No one
can be a judge in his own cause"] when the principle it embodies
bespeaks the propriety of its application. The immediate rights of the
litigants are not the only objects of the rule. A sound public policy,
which is interested in preserving every tribunal appointed by law from
discredit, imperiously demands its observance.161

In light of the inconsistent application of existing recusal standards, a new recusal approach is needed that will apply uniform
rules to all areas of judicial impropriety. When a biased decisionmaker sits, the legal process loses its legitimacy. Thus, protections
against abuses of judicial bias or relationship are as necessary as
safeguards against abuse of pecuniary interest.
This Article has attempted to illustrate how the philosophical
foundations of due process have serious ramifications for the
nature of constitutional protections against judicial partiality. It
has suggested that systemic values warrant consideration in determining the nature of due process jurisprudence. To accept the
desirability of incorporating these systemic concerns, the inherent
value of fair procedures must be recognized, and it follows that
the protection of just procedures should be an element of due
process recusal guarantees. When procedural integrity is abused by
a violation of judicial bias or relationship, the effect on the
procedural system is as severe as a violation resulting from judicial
pecuniary interest in a case. The approach for regulating judicial
disqualification suggested by systemic due process attempts to
guarantee necessary, stringent protections against all forms of
potential judicial impropriety.
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Stockwell v. Township Bd., 22 Mich. 341, 350 (1871).
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